J.R. v. Ventura Unified School District

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

J. R., a minor, by and through his

mother, Mary Perez,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

VENTURA UNIFIED SCHOOL

DISTRICT,

Defendant - Appellant.

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Hernan Diego Vera, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted October 6, 2025

San Francisco, California

Filed April 22, 2026

Before: Jacqueline H. Nguyen and Daniel A. Bress, Circuit

*

Judges, and Richard D. Bennett, District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Bress

* The Honorable Richard D. Bennett, United States District Judge for the

District of Maryland, sitting by designation.

The panel held that for an IDEA claim alleging that a school

district’s failure to assess and diagnose a student has resulted

in the alleged denial of a free appropriate public education

(FAPE), the statute of limitations begins to run when parents

know or should know (1) the fact of the school district’s

action or inaction (i.e., the failure to assess and diagnose),

and (2) that their child is being denied a FAPE (i.e., the

child’s education is inadequate).

SUMMARY**

Individuals with Disabilities Education Act

Reversing the district court’s judgment, the panel held

that a lawsuit brought by parents against the Ventura Unified

School District under the Individuals with Disabilities

Education Act (IDEA) was untimely as to educational

services their child received before 2019.

As a preliminary matter, the panel held that the district

court’s judgment—which fully resolved the merits and left

only the question of attorneys’ fees pending—was final and

appealable for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

The parents challenged the school district’s alleged

failure to assess their child for autism. They did not sue until

the child was diagnosed with autism in 2021, but they sought

relief from the school district for allegedly inadequate

education going back to 2012.

The panel held that the parents’ IDEA suit was untimely

as to educational services received prior to 2019. The IDEA

requires that parents must challenge their child’s allegedly

inadequate special education within two years of the date the

parents “knew or should have known about the alleged

action that forms the basis of the complaint.” 20 U.S.C.

§ 1415(f)(3)(C). This statute of limitations sets forth a

discovery rule, providing that actual or constructive

knowledge is sufficient to start the limitations period. The

panel held that for an IDEA claim alleging that a school

district’s failure to assess and diagnose a student has resulted

in the alleged denial of a free appropriate public education

(FAPE), the statute of limitations begins to run when parents

know or should know (1) the fact of the school district’s

action or inaction (i.e., the failure to assess and diagnose),

and (2) that their child is being denied a FAPE (i.e., the

child’s education is inadequate). Here, because the parents

knew the school district had not assessed their child for

autism and had sufficient reason to believe his education was

chronically inadequate, their claims predating the limitations

period were time-barred.

Adopting the Third Circuit’s analysis, the panel found

inapplicable an exception to the two-year limitations period

based on misrepresentations by the local educational agency

that it had resolved the problem forming the basis of the

complaint. The panel also found inapplicable an exception

based on withholding of required information from a parent.

Accordingly, the panel reversed the district court’s

judgment awarding benefits for the 2012-2019 period,

vacated the district court’s remedial order establishing an

educational trust and its order granting a motion to enforce

the judgment, and remanded for any further proceedings as

to attorneys’ fees.

COUNSEL

Andréa M. Marcus (argued), Law Office of Andréa Marcus,

Montecito, California, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Molly E. Thurmond (argued) and Melissa Hatch, Hatch &

Cesario, Ventura, California, for Defendant-Appellant.

Jennifer Nix and Olivia P. Brown, Fagen Friedman &

Fulfrost LLP, Oakland, California; Kristin Lindgren-

Bruzzone, Bode Owoyele, and Dana Scott, California

School Boards Association’s Education Legal Alliance,

West Sacramento, California; for Amicus Curiae California

School Boards Association’s Education Legal Alliance.

Selene A. Almazan-Altobelli, Council of Parent Attorneys

and Advocates Inc., Towson, Maryland; Catherine M.

Reisman, Reisman Gran Zuba LLP, Cherry Hill, New

Jersey; for Amici Curiae Council of Parent Attorneys and

Advocates Inc., The California Association for Parent-Child

Advocacy, and Disability Rights Education and Defense

Fund.

OPINION

BRESS, Circuit Judge:

We consider the timeliness of a lawsuit under the

Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). The

IDEA requires that parents must challenge their child’s

allegedly inadequate special education within two years of

the date the parents “knew or should have known about the

alleged action that forms the basis of the complaint.” 20

U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(C). In this case, the parents challenge

the school district’s alleged failure to assess their child for

autism. The parents did not sue until their son was diagnosed

with autism in 2021, but they sought relief from the school

district for allegedly inadequate education going back to

2012—the entire tenure of the student’s time in the school

district.

We hold that the parents’ IDEA suit is untimely as to

educational services received prior to 2019. Because the

parents knew the school district had not assessed their child

for autism and had sufficient reason to believe his education

was chronically inadequate, the claims predating the

limitations period are time-barred. A later clinical diagnosis

may confirm the problem, but it does not automatically

restart the IDEA’s clock. We reverse the contrary judgment

of the district court.

I

A

The IDEA seeks “to ensure that all children with

disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public

education,” or “FAPE.” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A); see

Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-

1, 580 U.S. 386, 390–91 (2017). In return for federal

funding, school districts must provide students with

disabilities a FAPE that meets various standards and their

unique needs. See A.J.T. v. Osseo Area Schs., Indep. Sch.

Dist., 605 U.S. 335, 339–40 (2025); L.A. Unified Sch. Dist.

v. A.O., 92 F.4th 1159, 1165 (9th Cir. 2024). To that end, the

IDEA requires that school districts “conduct a full and

individual initial evaluation” that assesses children in “all

areas of suspected disability,” using “a variety of . . .

technically sound instruments.” 20 U.S.C.

§ 1414(a)(1), (b)(2)–(3). A disability is “‘suspected,’ and

therefore must be assessed by a school district, when the

district has notice that the child has displayed symptoms of

that disability.” Timothy O. v. Paso Robles Unified Sch.

Dist., 822 F.3d 1105, 1119 (9th Cir. 2016).

Once a child is determined to have a disability, a team

that includes a local educational agency representative,

teachers, and the child’s parents formulates an

individualized education plan (IEP). 20 U.S.C.

§ 1414(d)(1)(B); Endrew F., 580 U.S. at 391; Winkelman ex

rel. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 524

(2007). As a “comprehensive plan” for the child’s education

prepared based on collaboration between teachers, school

officials, and parents, McIntyre v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 4J, 976

F.3d 902, 910 (9th Cir. 2020), the IEP is “the centerpiece of

the statute’s education delivery system for disabled

children.” Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311 (1988). Among

other things, “the IEP must describe the

‘special education and related services . . . that will be

provided’ so that the child may ‘advance appropriately

toward attaining the annual goals.’” McIntyre, 976 F.3d at

910 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(IV)). The school

district must reevaluate the child at least once every three

years, unless the parent agrees that a reevaluation is

unnecessary. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(2)(B)(ii).

The IDEA allows parents to challenge a school district’s

provision of special education. Parents can file due process

complaints “with respect to any matter relating to the

identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the

child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education

to such child.” Id. § 1415(b)(6)(A). This complaint

“triggers a preliminary meeting between the parents and the

IEP team,” and “[i]f the complaint is not resolved to the

parents’ satisfaction, the parents have a right to a ‘due

process hearing’ before an administrative law judge.” L.B.

v. S.D. Unified Sch. Dist., 168 F.4th 1150, 1155 (9th Cir.

2026) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e), (f)(1)(B)(i), then quoting

id. § 1415(f)(1)(A)). If a party aggrieved disagrees with the

administrative findings and decision, the IDEA allows for

judicial review in state and federal court. 20 U.S.C.

§ 1415(i)(2)(A); see Anchorage Sch. Dist. v. M.P., 689 F.3d

1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 2012).

In 2004, Congress amended the IDEA to add a statute of

limitations. See Avila v. Spokane Sch. Dist. 81, 852 F.3d

936, 940 (9th Cir. 2017); G.L. v. Ligonier Valley Sch. Dist.

Auth., 802 F.3d 601, 608–09 (3d Cir. 2015). Section

1415(f)(3)(C) now provides:

A parent or agency shall request an impartial

due process hearing within 2 years of the date

the parent or agency knew or should have

known about the alleged action that forms the

basis of the complaint, or, if the State has an

explicit time limitation for requesting such a

hearing under this subchapter, in such time as

the State law allows.

California has adopted this same two-year statute of

limitations. See Cal. Educ. Code § 56505(l). In addition,

Congress specified two exceptions to the limitations period.

The two-year statute of limitations in § 1415(f)(3)(C) has

two exceptions. Specifically, the “timeline” in

§ 1415(f)(3)(C) shall not apply to a parent if the parent was

prevented from requesting the hearing due to

(i) specific misrepresentations by the local

educational agency that it had resolved the

problem forming the basis of the complaint;

or (ii) the local educational agency’s

withholding of information from the parent

that was required under this subchapter to be

provided to the parent.

20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(D). Once the administrative law

judge issues a decision, an aggrieved party has 90 days to

file suit in state or federal court. Id. § 1415(i)(2)(B).

B

From 2012 to 2021, J.R. was a student at Ventura

Unified School District (VUSD) in Ventura, California. In

2012, when J.R. was six years old and in kindergarten,

VUSD conducted an initial psychoeducational assessment of

him, with his parents’ consent. VUSD school psychologist

Roxana Llano administered the assessment and documented

“clinically significant” behavior ratings in hyperactivity,

attention, and atypicality; poor auditory processing; and

lower-extreme to below-average academic ranges. Llano

also noted teachers’ concerns about J.R.’s ability to stay on

task, his maturity, and his ability to follow directions.

Based on the 2012 assessment, VUSD concluded that

J.R. had a “specific learning disability”—a statutory

category that “means a disorder in 1 or more of the basic

psychological processes involved in understanding or in

using language, spoken or written.” Id. § 1401(30)(A).

VUSD did not assess J.R. for autism or discuss it as a

possibility with J.R.’s parents.

Between 2013 and 2015, J.R. continued to exhibit

significant behavioral and social deficits. Teachers reported

that he struggled to follow directions, yelled, and frequently

blurted out inappropriate sounds or comments. Starting in

second grade, J.R. began receiving special education for all

subjects in a classroom designed for students with mild to

moderate learning disabilities. In 2015, VUSD school

psychologist Katherine Beley conducted J.R.’s triennial

assessment and concluded that J.R.’s cognitive functioning

was “very low for most types of tasks.” While Beley noted

that J.R.’s behavior had improved since the prior year, his

“atypicality” rating remained “clinically significant.”

VUSD again did not assess J.R. for autism.

By 2018, J.R. still was not progressing. While school

psychologist Jana Woodruff’s 2018 assessment showed that

J.R.’s behavioral scores had improved into the “Average”

range, most of his academic skills were “Well Below

Average,” with language skills in the first percentile or

lower. Now in sixth grade, J.R. was still reading at a

kindergarten level. As reflected in the assessment, J.R.’s

mother expressed concern that J.R. was “not learning or

advancing.” The 2018 assessment was also the first to

specifically mention autism as a possibility, but Woodruff

concluded that “[b]ased on parent reports, school records,

observations and current testing,” J.R. “does not appear to

meet eligibility criteria for Autism.”

In 2018, J.R.’s parents sought an evaluation from a

private psychologist, Dr. Nick Barneclo. Barneclo, like

VUSD, diagnosed J.R. with a specific learning disability.

Barneclo did not mention autism as a possibility. J.R.’s

parents then requested that VUSD provide J.R. with

additional individualized instruction from a reading

specialist, but VUSD denied their request because J.R. was

already receiving special education in every subject,

including reading. In response, J.R.’s mother expressed

frustration that J.R. “has not made progress since the 1st

grade.” She informed VUSD that she would seek legal

assistance and was considering filing a lawsuit against

VUSD. But no lawsuit materialized.

In February 2021, when J.R. was in ninth grade, VUSD

school psychologist Kaylee Peterson conducted J.R.’s fourth

triennial assessment. J.R. continued to score in the first

percentile or below in most areas, and some of his behavioral

scores were now in the “Clinically Significant” range. In the

meeting to discuss VUSD’s 2021 assessment, J.R.’s mother

asked if VUSD had “ever thought about assessing him for

autism.” Peterson told J.R.’s mother that “[t]here wasn’t

anything within the current assessment that . . . indicated

that we need to look at autism.”

J.R.’s mother did not sign off on J.R.’s 2021 IEP.

Instead, she retained clinical psychologist Dr. B.J. Freeman

to conduct another independent assessment of J.R. Freeman

conducted additional tests, reviewed J.R.’s VUSD file,

interviewed J.R.’s mother and teachers, and observed him at

school. In June 2021, Freeman diagnosed J.R. with autism.

By October 2021, J.R. had moved to Texas.

C

J.R., through his parents, filed a due process complaint

against VUSD on April 8, 2021, through California’s Office

of Administrative Hearings (OAH). J.R.’s complaint

primarily alleged that VUSD had failed to assess him for

autism beginning in 2012. An Administrative Law Judge

(ALJ) held a fourteen-day hearing in the fall of 2021.

Various witnesses testified, including J.R.’s mother, all four

VUSD psychologists who had assessed J.R., and plaintiff’s

expert, Freeman, who had recently diagnosed J.R. with

autism.

On January 24, 2022, the ALJ issued a 97-page decision.

The ALJ first found that the IDEA’s two-year statute of

limitations barred J.R.’s claims predating April 8, 2019. The

ALJ reasoned that VUSD’s assessments of J.R. and the IEP

meetings from 2012 to 2019 put J.R.’s parents “on notice of

the very behaviors which [J.R.] argued were indicative of

autism.” And because VUSD informed J.R.’s parents about

all the assessments it conducted, J.R.’s parents should have

known that VUSD had not assessed for autism. The ALJ

thus concluded that prior to 2019, J.R.’s parents “knew or

should have known about the alleged action that forms the

basis of the complaint.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(C). And

because neither of the exceptions to the statute of limitations

applied, see id. § 1415(f)(3)(D), claims predating April 8,

2019 were untimely.

As to the period after April 8, 2019, which was not time-

barred, the ALJ found that VUSD failed to provide J.R. with

a FAPE because VUSD did not assess J.R. for autism. The

ALJ ordered VUSD to furnish J.R. $19,000 for 152 hours of

compensatory education and to reimburse J.R.’s parents for

two independent evaluations they had commissioned.

On April 23, 2022, J.R., through his mother, filed a

complaint against VUSD in federal court seeking review of

the ALJ’s decision as it concerned educational services

received prior to April 8, 2019. The parties stipulated to

having the case decided on the papers. In a December 21,

2023 decision, the district court ruled in J.R.’s favor,

rejecting the ALJ’s statute of limitations determination and

finding that VUSD had denied J.R. a FAPE since 2012. The

district court issued its decision as a published opinion. See

J.R. v. Ventura Unified Sch. Dist., 668 F. Supp. 3d 1054

(C.D. Cal. 2023).

In the district court’s view, J.R.’s pre-2019 claims were

timely because his parents could not have known the basis

of their claims until J.R. was diagnosed with autism in 2021.

Id. at 1070–73. The court emphasized that J.R.’s parents had

“earnestly adhered to the district’s purportedly expert

guidance” and lacked the “specialized skill to contest J.R.’s

diagnosis.” Id. at 1071. Even though J.R.’s parents knew

that VUSD had not assessed J.R. for autism, they did not

know that VUSD should have assessed him for autism until

he was actually diagnosed with it in 2021. Id. at 1072–73.

According to the district court, “[a]bsent an

understanding that J.R.’s symptoms were symptoms of

autism, Parents did not have any reason to disagree with

Ventura.” Id. at 1071 (emphasis in original). In other words,

“in order for J.R.’s inadequate education to serve as notice,

Parents needed knowledge of the action (i.e., VUSD did not

test for autism) and knowledge that the action caused harm

(i.e., J.R. suffered from undiagnosed autism).” Id. at 1072–

73 (emphasis in original). The court also found that even if

the claims were otherwise barred under the two-year

limitations period, both statutory exceptions applied because

VUSD “recklessly misrepresented J.R.’s assessment results”

and “withheld information” that prevented J.R.’s parents

from understanding that VUSD had improperly diagnosed

him. Id. at 1073–74.

Having found the pre-2019 claims timely, the district

court next determined that VUSD’s failure to assess J.R. for

autism beginning in 2012 denied him a FAPE, noting that

J.R.’s pre-2019 symptoms were virtually identical to the

post-2019 symptoms that the ALJ had found actionable. Id.

at 1075–77. Approximately a year later, and after further

proceedings, the district court in December 2024 issued a

further order on the remedy, directing that VUSD pay

$510,960 into a special needs trust to fund compensatory

education for J.R., who by this point had moved to Texas.

The court specified that the trust would fund certain

educational services, such as reading and speech instruction.

VUSD appealed the district court’s decision to this court.

Subsequently, on July 30, 2025, the district court granted

J.R.’s motion to enforce the court’s judgment and directed

VUSD to fund the charitable trust by August 28, 2025.

VUSD separately appealed this post-judgment order. After

we heard oral argument, we granted VUSD’s motion to stay

enforcement of the district court’s July 30, 2025 post-

judgment order to fund the charitable trust, pending our

resolution of these appeals.

II

Before turning to the statute of limitations question, we

first address whether we have appellate jurisdiction.

Although the district court ruled for J.R. on the merits, it has

not yet resolved his motion for attorneys’ fees, which seeks

fees for work performed during both the ALJ and district

court proceedings. This included fees for successfully

prevailing before the ALJ on his post-2019 claims, a fee

request that was the subject of a stand-alone cause of action

in J.R.’s district court complaint.

The parties stipulated to stay proceedings on the fee

motion pending the outcome of this appeal, raising the

question of whether the judgment is final despite the

unresolved fee request. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The parties

agree we have jurisdiction. But we must independently

assess the issue for ourselves. See, e.g., In re Excel

Innovations, Inc., 502 F.3d 1086, 1092 (9th Cir. 2007). We

conclude that the district court’s decision is final under

§ 1291 and that we have jurisdiction.

In Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196

(1988), the Supreme Court adopted the “bright-line rule”

that “a decision on the merits is a ‘final decision’ for

purposes of § 1291 whether or not there remains for

adjudication a request for attorney’s fees attributable to the

case.” Id. at 202–03. Subsequent developments solidified

that rule. In 1993, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were

amended to provide that, unless the district court extends the

time to appeal, a motion for attorneys’ fees will not delay the

time for filing a notice of appeal. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(e);

Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), (a)(4)(A)(iii); Nutrition Distrib.

LLC v. IronMag Labs, LLC, 978 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir.

2020) (explaining the 1993 amendments “codif[ied]

Budinich’s bright-line rule”). Then, in Ray Haluch Gravel

Co. v. Central Pension Fund, 571 U.S. 177 (2014), the

Supreme Court clarified that Budinich applies to fee requests

based on contractual fee-shifting provisions, including fees

attributable to “preliminary steps toward litigation.” Id. at

189–90.

These authorities would confirm our jurisdiction

notwithstanding J.R.’s unresolved fee motion, were it not for

a footnote in an earlier decision of ours, Hacienda La Puente

Unified Sch. Dist. of Los Angeles v. Honig, 976 F.2d 487,

490 n.2 (9th Cir. 1992). In Hacienda, an IDEA case decided

after Budinich but before the 1993 rule amendments and Ray

Haluch, the student prevailed before a state hearing officer

and then, after the school district sought review of the ALJ’s

decision, the student filed a counterclaim in district court

seeking only the fees incurred during the administrative

proceedings. Id. at 489–90. The district court rejected the

school district’s challenge and awarded fees associated with

the administrative proceedings to the student. Id. at 490. In

a footnote, we addressed when the district court’s decision

became final. Id. at 490 n.2. We said that because the

student’s fee claim “did not involve fees pertaining to the

district court litigation, the rule separating for purposes of

finality a decision on the merits from a decision on attorney’s

fees ‘for the litigation at hand’ [was] not applicable,” such

that no final judgment existed until the district court resolved

the fee counterclaim. Id. at 490 n.2 (quoting Budinich, 486

U.S. at 201).

Hacienda predates the Supreme Court’s clarification in

Ray Haluch that Budinich’s bright-line rule applies even to

fees “accrued before the complaint was filed,” including

those attributable to “preliminary steps towards litigation”

and those “incurred prior to the commencement of

litigation.” 571 U.S. at 189–90. By confirming that pre-

litigation fees are “for the litigation at hand,” Budinich, 486

U.S. at 201, Ray Haluch may undercut the logic of

Hacienda’s footnote two.

Regardless, Hacienda does not govern here. Hacienda

specifically distinguished the situation before it from one

“involv[ing] fees pertaining to the district court litigation.”

Hacienda, 976 F.2d at 490 n.2. Here, J.R. seeks fees for both

the ALJ proceedings and the district court litigation. So this

case falls outside the scope of Hacienda’s footnote two, and

is governed by Budinich. The district court’s judgment—

which fully resolved the merits and left only the fee question

pending—is final for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

III

We now turn to the question that divided the ALJ and

district court: whether the IDEA’s statute of limitations bars

J.R.’s pre-2019 claims. We review “de novo the district

court’s conclusions of law, including the question whether a

claim is barred by a statute of limitations.” Avila, 852 F.3d

at 939. We conclude that J.R.’s pre-2019 claims are

untimely.

A

As set forth above, the IDEA requires parents to request

a due process hearing “within 2 years of the date the

parent . . . knew or should have known about the alleged

action that forms the basis of the complaint.” 20 U.S.C.

§ 1415(f)(3)(C). We held in Avila that this provision creates

a discovery rule, “meaning that the statute of limitations is

triggered when ‘a plaintiff discovers, or reasonably could

have discovered, his claim.’” Avila, 852 F.3d at 940

(quoting O’Connor v. Boeing N. Am., Inc., 311 F.3d 1139,

1147 (9th Cir. 2002)). Section 1415(f)(3)(C)’s “knew or

should have known” language confirms that actual or

constructive knowledge is sufficient to start the limitations

period. As the Supreme Court has explained, a discovery

rule “allow[s] a claim to accrue when the litigant first knows

or with due diligence should know facts that will form the

basis for an action.” Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633,

646 (2010) (quotation omitted); see also O’Connor, 311

F.3d at 1147 (discussing the reasonable diligence

requirement). At the same time, “mere suspicion of the

elements of a claim” is not enough, as a general matter, to

qualify as constructive knowledge. O’Connor, 311 F.3d at

1148. 
      

We have not had occasion since Avila to explore the

IDEA’s statute of limitations in any meaningful depth. But

we must do so to consider the argument, which the district

court adopted, that the limitations period did not begin to run

until J.R. was diagnosed with autism in 2021. We will

explain shortly why J.R.’s position is untenable. But we

begin with what we believe is the proper interpretation of the

statutory text and related precedent.

Under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(C), the IDEA’s statute of

limitations begins to run when parents have knowledge

(actual or constructive) of “the alleged action that forms the

basis of the complaint.” In a suit brought by parents, the

“alleged action” is whatever the school district has done or

failed to do under the IDEA. Here, by J.R.’s allegations, it

is the school district’s failure to assess J.R. for autism. And

the “basis of the complaint” is the alleged denial of the free

appropriate public education, or FAPE, to which the IDEA

entitles qualifying students.

Section 1415(f)(3)(C) thus reflects the statutory scheme

as whole, which focuses on whether the school district’s

actions resulted in the denial of a FAPE. The IDEA

specifically instructs ALJs who hear these challenges in the

first instance that, except in matters alleging a procedural

violation, “a decision made by a hearing officer shall be

made on substantive grounds based on a determination of

whether the child received a free appropriate public

education.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(i). And for

procedural violations, the hearing officer must consider

whether the child “did not receive a free appropriate public

education,” which is true only if the procedural inadequacies

“(I) impeded the child’s right to a free appropriate public

education; (II) significantly impeded the parents’

opportunity to participate in the decisionmaking process

regarding the provision of a free appropriate public

education to the parents’ child; or (III) caused a deprivation

of educational benefits.” Id. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii). Once

again, the denial of a FAPE is the central throughline.

Putting the pieces together, we hold that for an IDEA

claim alleging that a school district’s failure to assess and

diagnose a student has resulted in the alleged denial of a

FAPE, the statute of limitations begins to run when parents

know or should know (1) the fact of the school district’s

action or inaction (i.e., the failure to assess and diagnose),

and (2) that their child is being denied a FAPE (i.e., the

child’s education is inadequate). The second requirement is

essential, for mere awareness (actual or constructive) that a

school district has not diagnosed a student for a particular

disability is of little moment if the education is otherwise

meeting the student’s needs, or if the parents do not know or

have reason to know otherwise.

Our interpretation of the IDEA’s statute of limitations for

failure-to-assess claims follows from our decision in Avila.

There, after concluding that § 1415(f)(3)(C) creates a

discovery rule, we gave the district court guidance for how

to apply that rule on remand. We cautioned that parents

knowing about the school district’s assessments did “not

necessarily mean they ‘knew or had reason to know’ of the

basis of their claims.” Avila, 852 F.3d at 944. In other

words, the first part of our test—the parents’ actual or

constructive knowledge of the school district’s action—is

necessary but not sufficient for the statute of limitations to

begin to run, because parents must also know or have reason

to know that their child is being denied a FAPE. That

explains why Avila observed with approval that “[o]ther

courts have held that” the knew-or-should-have-known date

is “not necessarily when the parents became aware that the

district acted or failed to act,” but rather “when parents know

or have reason to know of an alleged denial of a free

appropriate public education under the IDEA.” Id. (citing

Somoza v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Educ., 538 F.3d 106, 114 (2d

Cir. 2008); Draper v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 518 F.3d

1275, 1288 (11th Cir. 2008)); see also Somoza, 538 F.3d at

114 (focusing on the date when “plaintiff’s mother knew or

should have known about the alleged denials of a FAPE”).

Avila supports and foreshadowed our two-part interpretation

above, which asks when parents know or have reason to

believe their child has been denied a FAPE. To be clear,

parents need not know the legal intricacies of what qualifies

as the denial of a FAPE. What matters is whether parents

are reasonably on notice that their child’s education is

substantially inadequate.

This interpretation of § 1415(f)(3)(C) accounts for the

fact that the IDEA’s statute of limitations, as a discovery

rule, places some onus on parents to act with reasonable

diligence. See, e.g., O’Connor, 311 F.3d at 1148. The IDEA

envisions a process through which parents are active—and,

at times, skeptical or adversarial—participants in the

formation of their child’s IEP. See Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer

v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 53 (2005). Parents are on the IEP

team, participate in IEP meetings, receive written notice of

any changes in services, must consent to all evaluations and

services, can request a reevaluation of the student once a

year, may obtain an independent educational evaluation of

the child, and can file a complaint regarding basically any

disagreement they have with the school district. See 20

U.S.C. §§ 1414(a)(1)(D)(i), (a)(2)(A)(ii), (d)(1)(B)(i);

1415(b); see also Timothy O., 822 F.3d at 1112 (“[T]he

IDEA contains a significant number of procedural

safeguards that are designed to ensure that the child’s parents

have sufficient information to understand and participate

meaningfully in all aspects of th[e] discussion.”). Parents

are not experts, and any reasonable application of the

IDEA’s discovery rule must account for this. See Avila, 852

F.3d at 944. But by affording parents extensive information

and input, the IDEA gives them important tools to advocate

for their children, and, with reasonable diligence, raise

challenges in a timely manner. As the Third Circuit put it,

“although a child’s right to special education under the

IDEA does not turn on parental vigilance, parental vigilance

is vital to the preservation and enforcement of that right.”

G.L., 802 F.3d at 625 (citation omitted).

At the same time, in assessing whether a claim is timely

under the IDEA, the denial of a FAPE is not synonymous

with a child simply struggling educationally or behaviorally.

Many students who are covered by the IDEA experience

regular difficulties in school. Keying the IDEA’s discovery

rule to the usual difficulties experienced by children with

disabilities would be akin to requiring the filing of a lawsuit

based on mere suspicion of a claim, which is not the law.

See O’Connor, 311 F.3d at 1148. The IDEA does not require

parents to rush to court any time their child has a bad day at

school. Such a rule would be inconsistent with both the

general principles underlying a discovery rule and with the

collaborative objectives of the IDEA, by which parents,

teachers, and administrators work as a team. See Schaffer,

546 U.S. at 53.

For all of these reasons, for an IDEA misdiagnosis-based

claim, the statute of limitations begins to run when parents

know or should know about the school district’s failure to

assess their child for a certain disability, and when the

inadequacy of the child’s education is sufficiently apparent

and persistent to put a reasonably diligent parent on notice

that the child is being denied a FAPE.

B

Applying these principles in this case, we agree with the

ALJ that J.R.’s parents knew or should have known about

the alleged action that forms the basis of their complaint by

the end of 2018, at the latest. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(C). By

that point, J.R.’s parents knew or should have known that

(1) VUSD had not assessed J.R. for autism; and (2) J.R. was

severely and chronically struggling, both behaviorally and

academically, meaning the parents were sufficiently on

notice that J.R. was not receiving a FAPE.

Starting with “the alleged action,” J.R.’s parents knew or

should have known that from 2012 to 2018, VUSD never

formally assessed J.R. for autism. VUSD’s proposed

assessment plans in 2012, 2015, and 2018 did not include

assessments for autism, and J.R.’s parents signed off on

those plans. The 2018 assessment was the first to mention

autism, and it concluded J.R. did not meet the eligibility

criteria. If J.R.’s parents disagreed with VUSD’s decision

not to assess for autism or if they had questions about it, they

could have investigated further or raised the issue with

VUSD. But there is no doubt they were aware that no autism

assessments had been conducted.

J.R.’s parents also knew or should have known that J.R.

was not receiving a FAPE by at least 2018. In his complaint,

J.R. alleged that the school district should have suspected

J.R. had autism because of his severe behavioral issues. But

J.R.’s parents were on notice of his behavioral issues going

back to 2012, when he was in kindergarten. VUSD’s 2012

Assessment documented “clinically significant” behavior

ratings in hyperactivity, attention, and atypicality. J.R.’s

teachers noted that he required “constant redirection and

clarification of instruction to perform classroom tasks” and

was “often engaged in his own activities.

” Subsequent IEPs in 2013 and 2014 repeated those observations, recording that

J.R. spoke loudly, struggled to follow directions, blurted

inappropriate words and sounds, exposed his stomach to

peers, and regularly disrupted academic instruction.

Although later assessments noted some improvement, his

2015 Assessment still scored him in the “clinically

significant” range for atypicality. And VUSD’s 2018

Assessment described how J.R. “moved his hands back and

forth on the table . . . patted his head when trying to think of

an answer, and tapped both fingers on the table.” Teachers

reported that during class, J.R. would sing, talk to himself,

and play with supplies. In short, J.R.’s parents were on

notice of his persistent behavioral shortcomings, which they

assert were the reasons why VUSD should have assessed

J.R. for autism.

The same can be said for J.R.’s academic struggles.

VUSD’s 2012 assessment already placed J.R.’s academic

performance in the “lower extreme to below average range.”

Teachers consistently reported his inability to master basic

reading and comprehension skills, and by second grade he

required placement in a special classroom for students with

learning disabilities. The 2013 IEP likewise reported below-

average cognitive function and severely delayed syntax,

morphology, and pragmatic language skills. VUSD’s 2015

Assessment similarly concluded that J.R.’s cognitive

functioning was “very low for most types of tasks.” And in

2018, he continued to score “Well Below Average” in nearly

every reading, writing, and math category, with language

skills in the first percentile or lower. J.R.’s February 2018

IEP confirmed he was reading at a kindergarten level despite

being in sixth grade, and he was unable to identify letters and

sounds correctly.

Based on the above facts, we conclude that by the end of

2018, at the very latest, J.R.’s parents knew or should have

known that he may not be receiving a FAPE. At that point

J.R. was in the sixth grade, but his academic skills were

woefully behind, and he was exhibiting many of the same

behavioral issues he had demonstrated since kindergarten.

Indeed, J.R.’s mother noted in the fall of 2018 that she found

it “hard to believe” J.R. was receiving the special education

specified by his IEP, “since he has not made progress since

the 1st grade” and “has been ‘stuck’ at the same reading level

for the last few years.” J.R.’s mother also around this time

retained an independent psychologist to conduct a

psychoeducational assessment of J.R. And in 2018, when

VUSD declined the request for J.R. to receive individualized

reading instruction, J.R.’s mother threatened to sue.

We sympathize with J.R.’s parents and can see from the

record that they tried to support J.R. in his efforts as a

student. But this same record also confirms that J.R.’s

parents knew or should have known, by at least 2018, that

VUSD’s assessments and educational services could be

substantially inadequate, yet J.R. waited another three years

to file suit. Cf. Somoza, 538 F.3d at 114 (noting that the

“latest date” when “plaintiff’s mother knew or should have

known about the alleged denials of a FAPE” was when the

mother “observed her daughter’s rapid improvement” in a

new program). Because J.R. did not file his complaint until

April 2021, we need not decide whether J.R.’s parents knew

or should have known prior to 2018 about the alleged action

that forms the basis for the complaint. Accounting for the

fact that J.R.’s parents are not experts, it is sufficient to

conclude that J.R.’s parents knew or should have known the

basis of the complaint prior to April 2019, given J.R.’s

chronic difficulties and notable failure to progress.

C

J.R. argues, and the district court agreed, that the IDEA’s

statute of limitations did not begin to run until J.R. was

diagnosed with autism in 2021. In the district court’s view,

“in order for J.R.’s inadequate education to serve as notice,”

J.R.’s parents needed to have knowledge that “J.R. suffered

from undiagnosed autism.” J.R., 668 F. Supp. 3d at 1072–

73. This reasoning was mistaken.

The problem with J.R.’s proposed approach is that it puts

all the focus on the parents’ actual knowledge. But the

IDEA’s statute of limitations is a discovery rule, which

requires courts to determine when parents knew or should

have known the relevant facts. See 20 U.S.C.

§ 1415(f)(3)(C); Avila, 852 F.3d at 940. This means that the

statute of limitations is triggered not just when a plaintiff

“discovers” her claim, but also when she “reasonably could

have discovered” it. Avila, 852 F.3d at 940 (quoting

O’Connor, 311 F.3d at 1147). J.R.’s parents surely knew

they had a claim against VUSD when he was diagnosed with

autism in 2021. But for the reasons explained above, on the

facts presented here, the parents knew or should have known

they had a claim under the IDEA by at least late 2018. The

district court’s per se rule that a new diagnosis automatically

restarts the clock is incompatible with the IDEA’s “knew or

should have known” standard.

Nor is it enough to say, as the district court did, that

J.R.’s parents are not disability experts. J.R., 668 F. Supp.

3d at 1071. The IDEA’s discovery rule should be applied

with due regard for the fact that parents are usually not

experts, and that is how we applied it above. But the fact

that most parents are not experts does not mean the statute

of limitations will only begin to run upon a new diagnosis,

which would again treat the statute of limitations as an actual

knowledge standard.

As we explained above, although parents are not medical

experts, parents under the IDEA bear some responsibility for

monitoring their children’s special education, see G.L., 802

F.3d at 625, as J.R.’s parents generally did here. In addition,

“[i]f the parents disagree with the school district’s evaluation

of their child, they have a right to ‘obtain an independent

educational evaluation’ . . . at public expense.” Timothy O.,

822 F.3d at 1111 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)); see also

34 C.F.R. § 300.502. School districts must notify parents of

this right. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(d)(2)(A). If parents choose

to exercise this right, the school district must either fund the

independent evaluation or file a due process complaint

explaining why its own evaluation was appropriate. 34

C.F.R. § 300.502(b)(2). This mechanism is another way the

IDEA ensures that parents can make informed assessments

about their child’s education. And here, J.R.’s parents did

obtain independent evaluations.

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Draper v. Atlanta

Independent School System, 518 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2008),

does not countenance a different result because that case

involved different facts. In Draper, the school district’s

initial 1998 assessment misdiagnosed the student with an

intellectual disability and failed to assess him for dyslexia,

even though he displayed clear symptoms. Id. at 1281.

Then, the district failed to conduct the statutorily required

triennial reevaluation, leaving the parents with no new

information until a second evaluation in 2003 revealed that

the original diagnosis was wrong. Id. at 1281, 1283, 1288.

On those facts, the Eleventh Circuit held that the statute of

limitations did not begin to run until the parents learned—

through the school district’s own reevaluation—that their

child had been misdiagnosed. Id. at 1288.

Draper’s reasoning, which was brief on this point, does

not apply here. The school district in Draper failed to

conduct a required evaluation altogether. Id. at 1281, 1283.

The court did not identify any facts that otherwise would

have put Draper’s parents on notice. And the parents sued

as soon as the second evaluation revealed that the first one

was deficient. Here, by contrast, VUSD conducted multiple

timely assessments of J.R. over the years—in 2012, 2015,

and 2018—and those evaluations, combined with J.R.’s

persistent lack of educational progress, put J.R.’s parents on

notice of the basis of their claims. J.R.’s parents did not sue

until 2021, nearly a decade after the first assessment. And

by late 2018, as we have discussed, J.R.’s parents had

themselves commissioned a separate independent evaluation

of their own and had threatened to sue the district. There

were no analogous circumstances in Draper.

Draper “decline[d] . . . to conclude, as a matter of law,”

that parents of children with special needs “should be

blamed for not being experts about learning disabilities.” Id.

at 1288. We fully agree with that sentiment. Draper

illustrates that a new diagnosis can of course be sufficient to

put parents on notice of their claims. And in certain

circumstances, the facts may support the conclusion that the

parents were not reasonably on notice prior to that date. But

just as Draper rejected a per se rule in favor of school

districts, it does not support the per se rule that a new

diagnosis always restarts the clock, regardless of how much

time has passed and the facts that the parents knew or should

have known.

In short, by dismissing the facts that should have put

J.R.’s parents on notice that his education was chronically

inadequate, the district court turned the IDEA’s objective

discovery rule into a subjective standard. That per se rule

would mean that parents could obtain a new diagnosis and

then sue for special education dating back years. In this case,

J.R. waited until 2021 to challenge allegedly inadequate

educational services he received some nine years earlier,

when he was in kindergarten. The IDEA’s statute of

limitations would be seriously undermined if such a suit

were allowed to proceed. On this record, J.R.’s parents knew

or should have known the basis of their complaint by 2018

at the latest. J.R.’s claims predating April 8, 2019 are

therefore time-barred.

D

We lastly address the two exceptions to the IDEA’s

statute of limitations. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(D). As an

alternative basis for its decision, the district court found that

both exceptions applied. J.R., 668 F. Supp. 3d at 1073–75.

Considering each exception in turn, we conclude that neither

applies.

1

The first exception provides that the limitations period

“shall not apply to a parent if the parent was prevented from

requesting the [due process] hearing due to . . . specific

misrepresentations by the local educational agency that it

had resolved the problem forming the basis of the

complaint.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(D)(i).

The only circuit to have considered this exception in

depth is the Third Circuit in D.K. v. Abington School District,

696 F.3d 233 (3d Cir. 2012). D.K. held that there must be a

“high threshold” for § 1415(f)(3)(D)(i) to apply: the

“misrepresentation” must be “akin to intent, deceit, or

egregious misstatement.” Id. at 245. The Third Circuit

based its interpretation on both the specific language of

§ 1415(f)(3)(D)(i) and that provision’s role in the broader

IDEA scheme. Central to the Third Circuit’s analysis was

the need to distinguish between situations when

§ 1415(f)(3)(D)(i) applies, on the one hand, and the school

district denying a child a FAPE, on the other. For if the latter

were always regarded as a “specific misrepresentation”

sufficient to trigger § 1415(f)(3)(D)(i), any IDEA violation

would automatically toll the limitations period. Id. at 245–

46. That interpretation, the Third Circuit reasoned, “would

allow the exception to become the rule, and the limitations

period would be all but eliminated.” Id. at 246 (quoting I.H.

ex rel. D.S. v. Cumberland Valley Sch. Dist., 842 F. Supp. 2d

762, 775 (M.D. Pa. 2012)).

To police the distinction between the merits of an IDEA

claim and a “specific misrepresentation” that removes the

statute of limitations bar, the Third Circuit held that for

§ 1415(f)(3)(D)(i) to apply, “plaintiffs must show that the

school intentionally misled them or knowingly deceived

them regarding their child’s progress.” Id. at 246. Under

this approach, “[m]ere optimism in reports of a student’s

progress” does not toll the limitations period. Id. at 245.

Instead, parents must “at least” show the

“school’s knowledge that its representations of a student’s

progress or disability [were] untrue or inconsistent with the

school’s own assessments.” Id. at 246.

We find the Third Circuit’s analysis persuasive and

consistent with the text and objective of § 1415(f)(3)(D)(i),

and we adopt it. Applying that interpretation, we conclude

that § 1415(f)(3)(D)(i) does not apply here. J.R. has not

shown that VUSD engaged in “intent, deceit, or egregious

misstatement” or that VUSD “intentionally misled” or

“knowingly deceived” his parents. D.K., 696 F.3d at 245–

46. The district court erred in concluding otherwise.

First, the district court focused on a statement that VUSD

included in each of its triennial assessments of J.R.: “Student

was assessed in all areas of suspected disability. ” J.R., 668

F. Supp. 3d at 1073, 1075.

This statement is one of several general statements, provided in bullet-point form, that

VUSD included in its regular assessments. But this

statement does not amount to a “specific misrepresentation”

that VUSD had either tested J.R. for autism and found none,

or that it did not test him for autism while privately believing

that such a test was necessary. No evidence supports either

position. The district court erred in treating the district’s

failure to test for autism, a potential violation of the IDEA,

see Timothy O., 822 F.3d at 1119, as sufficient to trigger

§ 1415(f)(3)(D)(i). See D.K., 696 F.3d at 245–46.

Second, the district court found that VUSD school

psychologists made “objectively false and misleading”

statements in their triennial assessments of J.R. J.R., 668 F.

Supp. 3d at 1074. In 2012 and 2015, J.R. scored in the

“clinically significant” range for atypicality on the

Behavioral Assessment System for Children (BASC). And

an internal VUSD document titled “2015 BASC Diagnostic

Considerations” noted that J.R.’s scores “tend to be

relatively high compared with the general population” in

categories potentially suggestive of autism (although it made

this general statement as to various other disabilities as well).

The district court found it significant that, notwithstanding

these observations, school psychologists Roxana Llano and

Katherine Beley did not mention autism as a possibility to

J.R.’s parents. Id. at 1074–75. Instead, Llano told J.R.’s

parents in 2012 that his scores “suggest a high level of

maladjustment and indicate that treatment is necessary.

”And Beley said in 2015, among other things, that J.R. scores

“indicate[] that J.R. sometimes behaves in ways that seem

strange.” From this the district court concluded that VUSD

made specific misrepresentations to J.R.’s parents in 2012

and 2015.

We see it differently. The difficulty we have with the

district court’s reasoning is that it again collapses the merits

of whether VUSD denied J.R. a FAPE by not assessing him

for autism with the distinct issue of tolling under

§ 1415(f)(3)(D)(i). See D.K., 696 F.3d at 245–46. In our

view, none of the statements in question from 2012 and 2015

amount to “specific misrepresentations” —reflecting “intent,

deceit, or egregious misstatement,” id. at 245—that VUSD

“had resolved the problem forming the basis of the

complaint.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(D)(i).

In the ALJ proceedings, Llano testified that she did not

suspect autism in 2012 based on a holistic view of J.R.’s

behaviors and test scores. Llano stated that J.R. did not

“present” as a child with autism because he was “super

friendly,” “sought people out all the time,” and “enjoy[ed]

relating with people very much.” Llano categorized his

“inappropriate social behaviors” as a lack of maturity often

seen in students with attention deficits, placing them “under

that umbrella,” rather than the “umbrella of autism.” Llano

further noted that she consulted with a team of people (a

resource specialist, a speech pathologist, and an

occupational therapist), and none of them—nor J.R.’s

parents or teachers—brought up autism as a concern in 2012.

And J.R.’s BASC scores merely “validated all of the

information that we gathered from interviews and

observations related to his inattention.”

Beley testified similarly to Llano. Beley explained that

she did not suspect autism because she believed J.R.’s

symptoms and test scores were more indicative of low

cognition, a significant learning disability, and attention

deficits. Beley observed that while J.R. was socially

immature, he did not display “stereotypical behaviors” of

autism. He was “very socially motivated,” “had friends,”

and was “excited to be with adults and gain their attention.”

While Beley acknowledged that J.R.’s teacher rated him in

the “clinically significant” range for atypicality on the

BASC, she testified that atypicality is not exclusive to

autism. She also explained that the internal “BASC

Diagnostic Considerations” document was “computer-

1 The district court also relied on the fact that, ahead of J.R.’s 2012 IEP

meeting, one teacher complained to a school administrator that another

school administrator had prevented her from presenting J.R.’s parents

with the option of enrolling J.R. in a “Special Day Class” to address his

deficient language skills. J.R., 668 F. Supp. 3d at 1073 n.21. But this

internal VUSD email chain does not constitute a specific

misrepresentation to J.R.’s parents, and, in any event, it did not mention

autism.generated,” and that she believed her professional

experience with the child and the multidisciplinary team’s

input were “more valid.

To the extent the judgments of these school

psychologists were mistaken, VUSD may have violated the

IDEA. See Timothy O., 822 F.3d at 1119. And we can

accept that if a school district egregiously misdiagnoses or

fails to diagnose a student’s disability, a parent may well be

able to point to statements by the school district that could

qualify as “specific misrepresentations.” Cf. Draper, 518

F.3d at 1288 (holding that parents’ claim was timely where

“[t]he persistent refusal of the School System to

acknowledge the substantial evidence of its misdiagnosis

borders on incredible”). But that is not this case. The

statements the psychologists made to J.R.’s parents did not

rise to the “high threshold” of a “specific misrepresentation,”

as there is no basis to conclude that VUSD “intentionally

misled [J.R.’s parents] or knowingly deceived them

regarding their child’s progress.” D.K., 696 F.3d at 245–46.

Indeed, the 2012 and 2015 communications conveyed the

opposite, namely, that J.R. continued to struggle in

significant ways, both behaviorally and academically. Nor,

as J.R. suggests, did the internal 2015 “BASC Diagnostics

Considerations” report conclude that J.R. likely had autism.

These same points address the district court’s concerns

with statements in J.R.’s 2018 assessment, which was

prepared by school psychologist Jana Woodruff. In her 2018

report, Woodruff concluded that J.R. “does not appear to

meet eligibility criteria for Autism.” She based this opinion

“on parent reports, school records, observations and current

testing,” noting that J.R.’s 2018 BASC scores “indicate

normal development in the area of pragmatic

communication.” In explaining her conclusion, Woodruff

observed that J.R. “does not demonstrate unusual responses

to sensory experiences.”

Woodruff’s statements did not contain any “specific

misrepresentations” within the meaning of

§ 1415(f)(3)(D)(i). There is no indication in the record that

Woodruff or VUSD believed in 2018 that J.R. had autism or

that further testing on that front was necessary. Nor was

VUSD’s alleged misdiagnosis so lacking in reason or

otherwise “incredible.” Draper, 518 F.3d at 1288; see D.K.,

696 F.3d at 247 (“As to subsection (i), neither the School

District nor its individual teachers intentionally or

knowingly misled Plaintiffs regarding the extent of D.K.’s

academic and behavioral issues or the efficacy of the

solutions and programs they attempted.”). Once again, that

VUSD may have denied J.R. a FAPE by not conducting a

further assessment in 2018 does not mean that it made

“specific misrepresentations . . . that it had resolved the

problem forming the basis of the complaint.” 20 U.S.C.

§ 1415(f)(3)(D)(i). J.R.’s evident disagreement with

Woodruff’s professional judgment does not make her

statements “specific misrepresentations.”

In any event, even if the 2018 assessment could be said

to contain “specific misrepresentations,” under

§ 1415(f)(3)(D)(i) those misrepresentations would only toll

the limitations period if they “prevented” the parents “from

requesting” a due process hearing. As the Third Circuit

explained in D.K., “[e]stablishing evidence of specific

misrepresentations . . . is insufficient to invoke the

exceptions; a plaintiff must also show that the

misrepresentations or withholding caused her failure to

request a hearing or file a complaint on time.” 696 F.3d at

The 2018 assessment played no such causal role here.

Just a few months after receiving Woodruff’s 2018 report,

J.R.’s parents retained a private psychologist to assess J.R.

And J.R.’s mother threatened legal action shortly after that,

in October 2018. There is no basis to conclude that the

reason J.R.’s parents decided not to sue was because of

Woodruff’s statement six months earlier.

Third, and finally, J.R. points to optimistic statements

that his teachers made to his parents, for example, that he

was making “great progress” in some areas. J.R. argues that

these statements understated his struggles and made his

parents think that his IEP plan was working, when it was not.

We agree with the Third Circuit, however, that if “[m]ere

optimism” from teachers qualified as specific

misrepresentations, the exception would swallow the rule.

D.K., 696 F.3d at 245. Each of the statements J.R. identifies

is about a specific assignment or area in which an individual

teacher observed J.R. making some progress—not a

“specific misrepresentation” that VUSD had “resolved” the

problem that is the basis of this lawsuit.

2

The second exception to the IDEA’s statute of

limitations applies “if the parent was prevented from

requesting the hearing due to . . . the local educational

agency’s withholding of information from the parent that

was required under this subchapter to be provided to the

parent.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(D)(ii). As the Third Circuit

observed, the statutory text “plainly indicates that only the

failure to supply statutorily mandated disclosures can toll

the statute of limitations.” D.K., 696 F.3d at 246. That is,

“plaintiffs can satisfy this exception only by showing that the

school failed to provide them with a written notice,

explanation, or form specifically required by the IDEA

statutes and regulations.” Id.

This exception does not apply in this case because J.R.

fails to identify any statutorily mandated disclosures that

VUSD withheld. The IDEA explicitly requires that school

districts provide certain information to parents. See, e.g., 20

U.S.C. § 1414(b)(1) (notice of proposed evaluation

procedures); § 1415(d)(1)(A) (notice of procedural

safeguards); § 1415(b)(3) (notice of change in identification,

evaluation, or placement of the child). But neither J.R. nor

the district court tie their justifications for this exception to

any disclosure provision in the IDEA. VUSD pointed this

problem out below, and the district court acknowledged that

VUSD “may be correct.” J.R., 668 F. Supp. 3d at 1073. But

the district court went on to find that the exception applied

anyway, for largely the same reasons as the first exception.

Because J.R. has not identified any statutorily mandated

disclosures that VUSD withheld, we conclude the tolling

exception in § 1415(f)(3)(D)(ii) does not apply.

IV

In sum, we hold that the IDEA’s two-year statute of

limitations bars J.R.’s claims predating April 8, 2019. We

therefore reverse the district court’s contrary decision

awarding benefits to J.R. for the 2012–2019 period. In light

of this conclusion, we also vacate the district court’s

December 23, 2024 remedial order establishing the

educational trust and its July 30, 2025 order granting J.R.’s

motion to enforce the judgment. Because the pre-2019

claims are time-barred, we do not reach VUSD’s additional

challenges to the district court’s remedial award and

directive that VUSD fund a special needs trust. We remand

this case to the district court for any further proceedings as

to attorneys’ fees.

REVERSED, VACATED, AND REMANDED.